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Abstract
This paper reports an experimental test of individual preferences for giving.
We use graphical representations of modiﬁed Dictator Games that vary the price
of giving. This generates a very rich data set well-suited to studying behavior
at the level of the individual subject. We test the data for consistency with
preference maximization, and we recover underlying preferences and forecast
behavior using both nonparametric and parametric methods. Our results em-
phasize that classical demand theory can account surprisingly well for behaviors
observed in the laboratory and that individual preferences for giving are highly
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This paper reports an experimental test of individual preferences for
giving. We use graphical representations of modiﬁed Dictator Games
that vary the price of giving. This generates a very rich data set well-
suited to studying behavior at the level of the individual subject. We test
the data for consistency with preference maximization, and we recover
underlying preferences and forecast behavior using both nonparametric
and parametric methods. Our results emphasize that classical demand
theory can account very well for behaviors observed in the laboratory and
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
We study individual preferences for giving. We emphasize the term individual
to highlight that we will investigate behavior at the level of the individual sub-
ject. We utilize a modiﬁed dictator game that expands upon an experiment
conducted by Andreoni and Miller (2002) (hereafter AM) in a number of funda-
mental ways. The modiﬁed dictator game varies the endowments and the prices
of giving, so that each subject faces a menu of budget sets over his own payoﬀ
and the payoﬀ of one other subject. We introduce a graphical computer interface
that allows for the eﬃcient collection of many observations per subject. Given
our rich data set, we can thoroughly address four types of questions concerning
preferences for giving (Varian 1982): (i) Consistency.I s b e h a v i o r c o n s i s t e n t
with the utility maximization model? (ii) Recoverability. Can underlying pref-
erences be recovered from observed choices? (iii) Extrapolation. Can behavior
on previously unobserved budget sets be forecasted? (iv) Heterogeneity.T o
what degree do preferences diﬀer across subjects?
The importance of studying individual heterogeneity is emphasized by AM,
who also test observed behavior for consistency with the utility maximization
model by applying the axiom of revealed preference. AM report that classical
demand theory is indeed relevant to the interpretation of the experimental data
and that preferences are very heterogeneous. Because of this heterogeneity,
AM conclude that it is necessary to investigate behavior at an individual level.
However, their experimental design involves few budgets sets and allows for
only a small number of decisions per subject, which necessitates the pooling of
observations across subjects. Our experimental design allows subjects to make
numerous choices over a wide range of budget sets, and this yields a rich dataset
that is well-suited to analysis at the level of the individual subject.
We begin our analysis of the experimental data by testing for consistency
with utility maximization using revealed preference axioms. Afriat (1967) shows
that if ﬁnite choice data satisfy the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference
(GARP), there exists a well-behaved utility function that the choices maximize.
Varian (1982) modiﬁes Afriat’s (1967) results and describes the most eﬃcient
and general techniques for testing the extent to which choices satisfy GARP.
Since GARP oﬀers an exact test (i.e. either the data satisfy GARP or they do
not) and choice data almost always contain at least some violations, we calculate
a variety of goodness-of-ﬁt indices described by Varian (1991) to quantify the
extent of violation. We ﬁnd that most subjects exhibit behavior that appears
to be almost optimizing in the sense that their choices nearly satisfy GARP, so
that the violations are minor enough to ignore for the purposes of recovering
preferences or constructing appropriate utility functions.
We therefore move to recovering underlying preferences and forecasting be-
havior in new situations. We begin by using the revealed preference techniques
developed by Varian (1982). This approach is purely nonparametric and com-
pares arbitrary allocations or budgets assuming only consistency with previously
observed behavior and making no assumptions about the parametric form of the
underlying utility function. Because of our rich data set, we are able to generate
2fairly tight bounds on these measures. We conduct case studies of several sub-
jects that almost satisfy GARP and who serve to illustrate ideal types whose
choices ﬁt with prototypical preferences.
Motivated by patterns observed in the nonparametric approach, we estimate
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) demand functions for giving at the
individual level. The CES form is very useful in many applications since it
spans a range of well-behaved utility functions by means of a single parameter.
We ﬁnd that the CES demand function provides a good ﬁta tt h ei n d i v i d u a l
level. Moreover, the parameter estimates vary dramatically across subjects,
implying that individual preferences for giving are very heterogeneous, ranging
from perfect substitutes to Leontief. However, like Charness and Rabin (2002),
we do ﬁnd that a signiﬁcant majority of subjects are concerned with increasing
aggregate payoﬀs rather than reducing diﬀerences in payoﬀs.
Our paper contributes to the large and growing body of work that seeks to
explain departures from self-interest in economic experiments. Social prefer-
ences theories include altruism, relative income and envy, inequality aversion,
and altruism and spitefulness (see, respectively, Charness and Rabin (2002),
Bolton (1991), Levine (1998) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999), among others).
Our paper provides a couple of important innovations over previous work. Our
primary methodological contribution is an experimental technique that enables
us to collect richer data about preferences for giving than has heretofore been
possible. This enables us to analyze preferences for giving at the individual level.
Further, previous experimental studies have inferred preferences from a small
number of individual decisions and hence have been forced to set up relatively
extreme choice scenarios. In contrast, we do not force subjects into choices that
suggest discrete and extreme prototypical preference types. The experimental
techniques and our results provide promising tools for future work in this area.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes
the experimental design and procedures. Section 3 summarizes some important
features of the data. Section 4 provides the nonparametric analysis, and Section
5 provides the parametric analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 Experimental design and procedures
2.1 Design
We begin by discussing a very general formulation of the dictator game, before
outlining the linear version that we utilize in our experiments. We adopt AM’s
notation and model a generalized dictator game by a set of two persons s and
o (s for self and o for other), a compact subset of the plane Π representing
the feasible monetary payoﬀ choices of person s (i.e. each point π =( πs,πo)
in Π corresponds to the payoﬀst op e r s o n sself and other, respectively), and a
preference ordering %sfor person s. For any π,π0 ∈ Π, π %s π0 if and only if
person s prefers π to π0 or is indiﬀerent between them. The preference ordering
%scan be represented by a utility function Us = us(πs,πo) that captures the
3possibility of giving if us(π) ≥ us(π0) whenever π %s π0.P e r s o ns is said to be
selﬁsh,o ra no w n - p a y o ﬀ maximizer, when π %s π0 if and only if πs ≥ π0
s.T h e
objects s,Π and %s deﬁne the dictator game.
The set Π of feasible payoﬀ pairs may take many forms and one should ulti-
mately put no restrictions directly on Π. Yet, in a typical dictator experiment,
ﬁrst introduced by Forsythe, et al. (1994), subject s divides some endowment
m between self and other in any way he wishes such that
Π = {(πs,πo):πs + πo = m}.
One respect in which this framework is restrictive is that the set Π is always the
line with a slope of −1 so the problem faced by person s is simply allocating a
ﬁxed total income between self and other.
A full generalization of the dictator game would allow for nonlinear budget
sets. But because a great deal of classical theory is built on the assumption
of a simple linear budget constraint, the simplest and perhaps most important
generalization of the dictator game, developed by AM, allows for an endowment
which is to be spent on πs and πo at given ﬁxed corresponding price levels ps
and po.B yc h o o s i n gps as the numeraire price, the set of normalized possible
payoﬀs for the game can then be written
Π = {(πs,πo):πs + pπo = m0}
where p = po/ps is the relative price of giving and m0 = m/ps.T h i sc o n ﬁgura-
tion creates budget sets over πs and πo that allow for the thorough testing of
observed dictator behavior for consistency with utility maximization.1
2.2 Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the Experimental Social Science Laboratory
(X-Lab) at the University of California, Berkeley under the X-Lab Master Hu-
man Subjects Protocol.2 The 76 subjects in the experiment were recruited from
all undergraduate classes at UC Berkeley and had no previous experience in
experiments of dictator, ultimatum, or trust games. After subjects read the
instructions, the instructions were read aloud by an experimenter.3 The exper-
imental instructions build on AM with minor changes to reﬂect employment of
computers and are available upon request. Each experimental session lasted for
about one and a half hours. A $5 participation fee and subsequent earnings,
which averaged $16, were paid in private at the end of the session.4 Throughout
1Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) utilize the same design as AM to study whether prefer-
ences for giving diﬀer by gender. They ﬁnd that men are more responsive to price change and
likely to be either perfectly selﬁsh or utilitarian, whereas women tend to be Rawlsian.
2See http://xlab.berkeley.edu/cphs/master_protocol.pdf.
3At the end of the instructional period subjects were asked if they had any questions or any
diﬃculties understanding the experiment. No subject reported any diﬃculty understanding
the procedures or using the computer program.
4Payoﬀsw e r ec a l c u l a t e di nt e r m so ft o k e n sa n dt h e nt r a n s l a t e da tt h ee n do ft h ee x p e r i m e n t
into dollars at the rate of 3 tokens = 1 dollar.
4the experiment we ensured anonymity and eﬀective isolation of subjects in order
to minimize any interpersonal inﬂuences that could stimulate other-regarding
behavior.5
Each session consisted of 50 independent decision-problems. In each decision
problem, each subject was asked to allocate tokens between himself πs and an
anonymous subject πo, where the anonymous subject was chosen at random
from the group of subjects in the experiment. Each choice involved choosing a
point on a graph representing a budget set over possible token allocations. Each
decision problem i =1 ,...,50 started by having the computer select a budget
set randomly from the set
{pi
sπs + pi
oπo ≤ mi : mi/pn ≤ 100 for both n = s,o
and mi/pn ≥ 50 for some n = s,o}
(i.e. budget sets that intersect with at least one of the axes at 50 or more tokens,
but with no intercept exceeding 100 tokens). For comparison, in AM, the full
menu of budgets oﬀered included only 8 budget constraints in four sessions and
11 in one session with m = {40,60,75,100} and p = {1/4,1/3,1/2,1,2,3,4}.
The sets selected for each subject in diﬀerent decision problems were indepen-
dent of each other and of the sets selected for any of the other subjects in their
decision problems. Notice that choices were not restricted to allocations on the
budget constraint so that, in theory, subjects could costlessly dispose payoﬀs
and violate budget balancedness (i.e. piπi = mi).
To choose an allocation, subjects used the mouse or the arrows on the key-
board to move the pointer on the computer screen to the desired allocation.
Subjects could either left-click or press the Enter key to make their allocation.
At any point, subjects could either right-click or press the Space key to ﬁnd out
the allocation at the pointer’s current position. The πs-axis and πo-axis were
labeled Hold and Pass respectively and scaled from 0 to 100 tokens. The reso-
lution compatibility of the budget sets was 0.2 tokens; the sets were colored in
light grey; and the frontiers were not emphasized. The graphical representation
of budget sets also enabled us to avoid emphasizing any particular allocation.
At the beginning of each decision round, the experimental program dialog win-
dow went blank and the entire setup reappeared. The appearance and behavior
of the pointer were set to the Windows mouse default and the pointer was au-
tomatically repositioned at the origin π =( 0 ,0) at the beginning of each round.
This process was repeated until all 50 rounds were completed. At the end of
the experiment, payoﬀs were determined in the following way. The experimental
program ﬁrst randomly selected one decision round from each subject to carry
out. That subject then received the tokens that he held in this round πs,a n d
the subject with whom he was matched received the tokens that he passed πo.
T h u s ,a si nA M ,e a c hs u b j e c tr e c e i v e dt w og r o u p so ft o k e n s ,o n eb a s e do nh i s
own decision to hold tokens and one based on the decision of another random
subject to pass tokens. The computer program ensured that the same two
5Subjects’ work-stations were isolated by cubicles making it impossible for subjects to
observe other screens or to communicate.
5subjects were not paired twice. Subjects received their payment privately as
they left the experiment.
The experiments provide us with a very rich dataset. We have observations
on 76 × 50 = 3800 individual decisions over a variety of diﬀerent budget sets.
Most importantly, the broad range of budget sets provides a serious test of
the ability of classical theory, and a structural econometric model based on the
theory, to interpret the data. In particular, the changes in endowments and
relative prices are such that budget lines cross frequently. This means that
our data lead to high power tests of revealed preference conditions (see Varian
(1982), Bronars (1987), Russell (1992) and Blundell, Browning and Crawford
(2003)).
Aside from pure technicalities, our paper provides a couple of important
innovations over previous work. First it allows us to test a wider range of budget
sets than can be tested using the pencil-and-paper experimental questionnaire
method of AM. Second, it generates a rich dataset that provides the opportunity
to address recoverability and extrapolation at the level of the individual subject.
This is particularly important. As AM emphasize, individual heterogeneity
requires behavior to be examined at an individual level, before preferences can
properly be understood.
3 Overview of experimental data
In this section, we provide an overview of some important features of the exper-
imental data, which we summarize by reporting the distribution of allocations
in a number of ways. The histograms in Figure 1 show the distributions of the
fraction given to other,d e ﬁned in a couple of ways. Figure 1A depicts the dis-
tribution of the expenditure on tokens given to other pi
oπi












and Figure 1B depicts the distribution of the tokens given to other as a fraction







Clearly, this distinction is only relevant in the presence of price changes. Further,
in each case we present the distribution for all allocations, as well as the distrib-
utions by three price terciles: intermediate prices of around 1 (0.70 ≤ p ≤ 1.43),
steep prices (p>1.43) and symmetric ﬂat prices (p<0.70). The horizontal
axis measures the fractions for diﬀerent intervals and the vertical axis measures
the percentage of decisions corresponding to each interval.
[Figure 1 here]
6In Figure 1A, for the full sample there is a mode at the midpoint of 0.5




o). The number of alloca-
tions then decreases as we move to the left, before increasing rapidly to selﬁsh
allocations of 0.05 or less of the total expenditure on tokens for other,w h i c h
account for 40.5 percent of all allocations. This masks some heterogeneity by
price. For the middle tercile, the pattern is somewhat more pronounced, while
for the ﬂat tercile, there is no peak at the midpoint. Not surprisingly, the dis-
tribution is generally further to the left for steeper-sloped budgets. Figure 1B
shows a similar pattern to Figure 1A, though it is somewhat more skewed to
the left. Compared with studies of split-the-pie dictator games (See, Camerer
(2003) for a comprehensive discussion), the mode at the midpoint is relatively
less pronounced and the distribution is much smoother, even for the interme-
diate tercile allocations. Over all prices, our subjects gave to other about 19
percent of the tokens, accounting for 21 percent of total expenditure; this is very
similar to typical mean allocations of about 20 percent in the studies reported
in Camerer (2003).
The decision-level graphs in Figure 1 potentially obscure the presence of
individual concerns on average f o ro t h e r s . F o re x a m p l e ,ap e r s o nw h og i v e s
everything to other half of the time and keeps everything for self the other
h a l fw o u l dg e n e r a t ee x t r e m eg i v i n gv a l u e s ,w h e ni nf a c ts u c hap e r s o nk e e p s




o) presented in Figure 1A aggregated to the subject level.
Since this takes an average over all prices, the distribution should be similar
for πi/(πi
s + πi
o) (in practice, the histograms are identical once we aggregate
by decile). The horizontal axis measures the fractions for diﬀerent intervals
and the vertical axis measures the percentage of subjects corresponding to each
interval. Perhaps as expected, the distributions show a pattern with a larger
mode around the midpoint and no observations below the midpoint.
[Figure 2 here]
These aggregate distributions tell us little about the particular allocations
chosen by individual subjects. As a preview, Figure 3 shows the scatterplot of
the choices made by subjects whose choices correspond to prototypical prefer-
ences. Figure 3A depicts the choices of a selﬁsh subject (ID 4) U(πs,πo)=πs,
Figure 3B depicts the allocations of a subject with utilitarian preferences (ID
54) U(πs,πo)=πs + πo, and Figure 3C depicts the other extreme, that of a
Rawlsian subject (ID 46) U(πs,πo)=m i n {πs,πo}. Of our 76 subjects, 20 (26.3
percent) behaved perfectly selﬁshly. Only two (2.6 percent) subjects allocated
all their tokens to self if ps <p o and to other if ps >p o implying utilitarian
preferences, and two (2.6 percent) subjects made nearly equal expenditure on
self and other indicating Rawlsian preferences. By comparison, AM report that
40 subjects (22.7 percent) behaved perfectly selﬁshly, 25 subjects (14.2 percent)
could ﬁt with utilitarian preferences, and 11 subjects (6.2 percent) were con-
sistent with Rawlsian preferences. We also ﬁnd many intermediate cases, but
these are diﬃcult to see directly on a scatterplot due to the fact that both p





Varian (1982) describes a set of techniques, based on revealed preference axioms,
through which to test a ﬁnite set of data for consistency with utility maximiza-
tion, to recover preferences from the data, and to forecast demand behavior on
budget sets which have not been previously observed.
Let (pi,πi) for i =1 ,...,n be some observed individual data (i.e. pi de-
notes the ith observation of the prices and πi denotes the associated allocation).
Throughout this section it will be convenient to normalize the prices, pi
s and pi
o,
by the endowment mi at each observation so that piπi =1for all i.
First, we recall that πi is directly revealed preferred to π if piπi ≥ piπ and
strictly directly revealed preferred if the inequality is strict. The relation indi-
rectly revealed preferred is the transitive closure of the directly revealed preferred
relation. We then deﬁne the following:
Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) If πi is indirectly
revealed preferred to πj,t h e nπj is not strictly directly revealed preferred
(i.e. pjπi ≥ pjπj)t oπi.
A utility function us(π) rationalizes the observed behavior if us(πi) ≥ us(π)
for all π such that piπi ≥ piπ (i.e. us achieves the maximum on the budget
set at the chosen bundle). GARP is tied to utility representation through the
following theorem, which was ﬁrst proved by Afriat (1967):
Afriat’s Theorem The following conditions are equivalent: (i)T h ed a t as a t -
isfy GARP. (ii) There exists a non-satiated utility function that ratio-
nalizes the data. (iii) There exists a concave, monotonic, continuous,
non-satiated utility function that rationalizes the data.6
The equivalence of (i)a n d( ii)e s t a b l i s h e sG A R Pa sad i r e c tt e s tf o rw h e t h e r
a ﬁnite data set may be rationalized by a utility function, and the equivalence
of (ii)a n d( iii) tells us that when a rationalizing utility function exists, it can
be chosen to be well-behaved.
In order to verify that the data satisﬁes GARP it is only necessary to have
an eﬃcient way to compute the transitive closure of a binary relation. A vari-
ety of easily implementable graph theoretic algorithms, such as that described
in Varian (1982), provide an eﬃcient way to check GARP by computing the
transitive closure of the directly revealed preference relation.
6This statement of the theorem follows Varian (1982), who replaced the condition Afriat
called cyclical consistency with GARP.
8To better understand our measures of consistency, it is instructive to describe
the basic idea underlying the algorithm (the computer program and details are
available from the authors upon request). Consider a directed graph G with a
set of nodes
V = {1,...,n}
and set of edges
E = ∪n
i=1{ij : piπi ≥ piπj}.
That is, the graph is a pair G =( V,E) of sets satisfying E ⊆ [V ]2 with nodes
representing individual decisions and edges representing directly revealed pre-
ferred relations. Note that the edges need not be symmetric: the existence of an
edge directed from i to j does not imply the existence of an edge from j to i (in
fact, this would imply a GARP violation if one of the inequalities were strict).
For any nodes i and j,a ni − j path is a ﬁnite sequence i1,...,i K such that
i1 = i, iK = j and pkπk ≥ pkπk+1 for k =1 ,...,K− 1 (i.e. a sequence of nodes
i1,...,iK linked by E). Note that a path represents a revealed preferred relation
in the data (i.e. πi is revealed preferred to πj if and only if there exists an
i−j path). A cyclic sequence of nodes that creates an i−i path called a cycle.
The length of a cycle is its number of edges, and a cycle of length k is called a
k-cycle. It follows directly from the deﬁnition that if G contains a cycle with at
least one strict inequality, then we have a violation of GARP. The number of
cycles in G is the number of GARP violations.
4.2 Goodness-of-ﬁt
As formulated above, GARP oﬀers an exact test: either the data satisfy GARP
and are therefore consistent with the utility maximization model, or they do
not. Unfortunately, choice data almost always contain at least some violations.
Hence, it is useful to measure the extent of GARP violation. We report mea-
sures of GARP violation based on three indices: Afriat (1972), Houtman and
Maks (1985), and Varian (1991) which we refer to as the E-index, V -index and
EV-index, respectively, according to whether they involve conditions on edges,
vertices, or both.
The ﬁrst index is what Afriat (1972) calls the critical cost eﬃciency index
(CCEI); it measures the amount by which each budget constraint must be re-
laxed in order to remove all violations of GARP. More precisely, let (ei) be a
vector of numbers with 0 ≤ ei ≤ 1.D e ﬁne G0 to be a spanning subgraph of G
(i.e. G0 =( V 0,E0) with V 0 = V and E0 ⊆ E)w i t h
E0 = ∪n
i=1{ij : eipiπi ≥ piπj}.
Then the CCEI is the largest number ei such that the subgraph G0 does not
contain any cycle, with at least one of the inequalities holding strictly. We call
this number the E-index. Note that the E-index provides a summary statistic
of the overall consistency of the data with GARP but gives no hint as to which
of the observations are causing violations. Figure 4 illustrates the construction
9of the E-index for a simple violation of GARP.7 Note that a small perturba-
tion A/B < C/D of the budget constraint through observation π0 removes the
violation.
[Figure 4 here]
The second test, proposed by Houtman and Maks (1985), ﬁnds the largest
subset of choices that is consistent with GARP. More formally, let G00 be an
induced subgraph of G (i.e. G00 =( V 00,E00),w i t hV 00 ⊆ V and E00 containing
all edges ij ∈ E with i,j ∈ V 00)a n dﬁnd the graph G00 with the largest order
|G00| (i.e. number of nodes) that does not contain any cycle. We call the
ratio |G00|/|G| the V -index; note that |G00|/|G| ∈ [0,1], with higher numbers
reﬂecting a larger subset of consistent observations. This method has a couple of
drawbacks. First, observations may be discarded even if the associated GARP
violations could be removed by small perturbations of the budget constraint.
Further, it is computationally very intensive and thus impractical if, roughly
speaking, cycles often overlap. As a result, we were unable to calculate the
V -indices for a small number of subjects who often violated GARP, and we
therefore report only lower bounds.
The third test follows Varian (1991), who reﬁned the E-index (Afriat’s
CCEI) by providing a more disaggregated measure that indicates the minimal
amount required to perturb each observation in order to remove all violations
of GARP. With a slight abuse of notation, let (vi) be a vector of numbers with
0 ≤ vi ≤ 1.L e tG000 be a spanning subgraph of G with
E000 = ∪n
i=1{ij : vipiπi ≥ piπj}.
Then, vi is the largest number such that the subgraph G000 does not contain any
i − i cycles, with at least one of the inequalities holding strictly. Thus, vi =1
if and only if G does not contain an i − i cycle. Note that (vi) need not be the
smallest perturbation of the data that is consistent with GARP because an i−i
cycle may often be broken by perturbing an edge which joins two other nodes
of the cycle. To describe eﬃciency, Varian (1991) uses the smallest (vi),w h i c h
we call EV-index. Note that the EV-index is a lower bound on the E-index.
The reasons for this discrepancy are discussed in Varian (1991).
Table 1 lists, by subject, the number of violations of budget balancedness
and GARP, and also reports the three indices according to descending E-values.
We need to allow for small mistakes resulting from the slight imprecision of
subjects’ handling of the mouse. The results presented in Table 1 allow for a
narrow conﬁdence interval of one token (i.e. for any i and j 6= i, if d(πi,πj) ≤ 1
then πi and πj are treated as the same allocation).
[Table 1 here]
7Here we have a violation of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) (i.e. πi is
directly revealed preferred to πj 6= πi and πj is directly revealed preferred to πi).
10Half of our subjects have no violations of budget balancedness, even with
the narrow one token conﬁdence interval; if we allow for a ﬁve token conﬁdence
interval, 64 subjects (84.2 percent) have no violations of budget balancedness.
The second column of Table 1 reports the conﬁdence interval required to remove
all budget balancedness violations.8
Turning now to GARP violations, out of the 76 subjects, only 8 (10.5 per-
cent) have no violations of GARP, but all of these are subjects that always chose
selﬁsh allocations πi =( mi/pi
s,0) for all i. However, 54 subjects, (71.1 percent)
had E-indices above the 0.90 threshold, and of those 41 subjects (53.9 percent)
were above the 0.95 threshold. In contrast, AM report that only 18 of their 176
subjects (10.2 percent) violated GARP, and of those only 3 had E-indices below
the 0.95 threshold. This is as expected, as our subjects were given a larger and
richer menu of budget sets which provides more opportunities to violate GARP
and thus improves the power of nonparametric tests of revealed preference the-
ory. Figure 5 shows the distributions of the three indices. The horizontal axis
measures the indices for diﬀerent intervals and the vertical axis measures the
percentage of subjects corresponding to each interval.
[Figure 5 here]
Nonetheless, we argue that most of our subjects are close enough to passing
GARP so that we may not want to reject that their choices are consistent
with utility maximization. To give greater precision to this notion, we wish to
generate a benchmark levels of consistency with which we may compare our
E-index and EV-index. As in AM, we use the test designed by Bronars (1987)
that uses the choices of a hypothetical subject who randomizes uniformly among
all allocations on each budget line as a benchmark. To this end, we generated
a random sample of 25,000 subjects and found that all of them violated GARP.
Their E-index and EV-index values averaged 0.60 and 0.25 respectively.9 If
we choose the 0.9 eﬃciency level as our critical value, we ﬁnd that only 12 of
the random subjects’ E-index values were above the threshold and none of the
subjects’ EV-index values were above this threshold. Using the same approach
on only 8 random budget sets, which is the number of decisions made by most
of AM’s subjects, we ﬁnd that random decisions generate average E-index and
EV-index values of 0.91 and 0.78 respectively.10
In order to determine the extent to which subjects are consistent with GARP
relative to random allocations, for each subject we take the diﬀerence between
his actual index and the average random-choice index as a fraction of the dif-
ference between consistent-choice index of one and the average random-choice
8We note that there are a few subjects that required large conﬁdence intervals, but that
these subjects also have many GARP violations even if the choices that violate budget bal-
ancedness are removed.
9Note that we cannot generate an average V -index for random subjects because of the
computational complexity required.
10Bronars’ test (i.e. the probability that a random subject violates GARP) has also been
applied to experimental data by Cox (1987), Sippel (1997), Mattei (2001) and Harbaugh,
Krause and Berry (2001). Our study has the highest Bronar power of one (i.e. all random
subjects had violations).
11index. We do this for both the E-index and EV-index. Subjects with no GARP
violations have a consistency of one and the average random subject has a con-
sistency of zero; obviously, negative values are possible if a subject performs
w o r s et h a nr a n d o m n e s s .T h er e s u l t sa r ep r e s e n t e di nt h eﬁnal two columns of
Table 1 above, and illustrated in the histograms of consistency values in Figure
6. As Figure 6 shows, the distribution of consistency values is skewed to the
right and almost uniformly positive; this provides a clear graphical illustration
of the extent to which subjects did worse than choosing consistently and the
extent to which they did better than choosing randomly.
[Figure 6 here]
4.3 Recovering preferences and forecasting behavior
If choice data satisfy GARP we would ideally like to extract a rationalizing
utility function through which to recover preferences and forecast choices on out-
of-sample allocations. Varian (1982) uses GARP and assumptions of convexity
and monotonicity to generate an algorithm that serves as a partial solution to
this so-called recoverability problem. This algorithm can also recover preferences
from choices, such as the ones in our experiment, that are almost consistent with
GARP. Further, since we observe many choices over a wide range of budget sets,
we can describe preferences with some precision.
We give a brief outline of Varian’s algorithm, which provides the tightest
possible bounds on indiﬀerence curves through an allocation π0 that has not
been observed in the previous data (pi,πi) for i =1 ,...,n.F i r s t , w e c o n s i d e r
the set of prices at which π0 could be chosen and be consistent (i.e. does not
add violations of GARP) with the previously observed data. This set of prices
is the solution to the system of linear inequalities constructed from the data
and revealed preference relations. Call this set S(π0). Second, we use S(π0) to
generate the set of observations, RP(π0), revealed preferred to π0 and the set
of observations, RW(π0), revealed worse than π0.
It is not diﬃcult to show that RP(π0) is simply the convex monotonic hull
of all allocations revealed preferred to π0. To understand the construction of
RW(π0),n o t et h a ti fπ0 is directly revealed preferred to some observation πi for
all prices p0 ∈ S(π0) (i.e. p0π0 ≥ p0πi), then it is indirectly revealed preferred
to any allocation in the budget set (pi,1) on which πi was chosen. Similarly, it
is indirectly revealed preferred to all observations that πi is revealed preferred
to and so on. Hence, the two sets RP(π0) and the complement of RW(π0) form
the tightest inner and outer bounds on the set of allocations preferred to π0.
Similarly, RW(π0) and the complement of RP(π0) form the tightest inner and
outer bounds on the set of allocations worse than π0.
Figure 7 depicts the construction of the bounds described above through
some allocation π0 for several subjects who almost satisfy GARP and who illus-
trate ideal types whose choices ﬁt with prototypical utility functions.11 Since
11Our computational experience with this technique reveals that if the data are not very
close to satisfying GARP then RP(π0) and RW(π0) overlap.
12the data is clustered in very diﬀerent areas on the graphs for diﬀerent subjects,
we look at indiﬀerence curves through the average choices of each subject. In
addition to the RW(π0) and RP(π0) sets, Figure 7 also shows the subjects’
choices (π1,...π50) as well as the budget sets used to construct RW(π0).F i g u r e
7A (top left) shows the bounds on the indiﬀerence curve through (40,25) for a
utilitarian subject (ID 54) where the revealed worse and preferred sets closely
bound a linear indiﬀerence curve with slope of about −1.12 Figure 7B (top
right) shows the bounds for a Leontief subject (ID 46) through (23,20) where
the bounds suggest a near-right angled indiﬀerence curve. Finally, Figure 7C
(bottom) shows the bounds for an intermediate-case subject (ID 30) through
(41,14) where the bounds imply indiﬀerence curves with some degree of curva-
ture, but with greater weight on πs. While these cases generate a particularly
close ﬁt, we may generally provide reasonably precise bounds for subjects that
nearly satisfy GARP, as the variation in p and m ensure that budget sets inter-
sect frequently.
[Figure 7 here]
We next turn our attention to forecasting behavior. We ask, that is, what set
of allocations could be chosen on a previously unobserved budget set. Varian
(1982) shows that this is the set of all allocations that support the budget
set in the sense of consistency with GARP. We skip the development of the
algorithm in the interests of brevity, and because it builds on the same algorithm
used to recover preferences above; we note that this set is the tightest estimate
of the underlying inverse demand correspondence. Figure 8 gives examples
of this set for the same group of subjects as in Figure 7 for the budget sets
(p,m)={(1,40),(3/2,40),(2,40)(2/3,60),(1/2,80)}. Again, note the tightness
of some of the sets and the diﬀerences among subjects. In the ﬁgure, the dotted
lines show hypothetical budget sets faced by the subjects, and the solid portions
of these lines show the set of points that could be chosen on these lines. The
dotted lines in Figure 8 show hypothetical budget sets faced by the subjects,
and the solid portions of these lines show the set of points that could be chosen
on these lines.
[Figure 8 here]
5P a r a m e t r i c a n a l y s i s
Afriat’s theorem tells us that if a rationalizable utility function exists, it can be
chosen to be increasing, continuous, and concave. Additionally, the patterns ob-
served in the nonparametric approach suggest that it is appropriate to estimate
a CES demand function. The CES is useful because attitudes towards giving
12The diﬀerence in the average values of πs and πo for subject ID 54 might look surprising,
given that he apparently has utilitarian preferences. This is due to the potential asymmetry
in the (randomly chosen) budget sets faced by each subject. In the case of subject ID 54, the
randomly selected budget sets had a relatively large fraction of steep slopes.
13can be adjusted by means of a single parameter. This is also the parametric
form chosen by AM.
The CES utility function is given by
Us =[ α(πs)ρ +( 1− α)(πo)ρ]1/ρ
where ρ represents the curvature of the indiﬀerence curves, α represents the
relative weight on the payoﬀ for self,a n dσ =1 /(ρ − 1) is the (constant)
elasticity of substitution. The CES approaches a perfect substitutes utility
function as ρ → 1 and the Leontief form as ρ →− ∞ .A sρ → 0, the indiﬀerence
curves approach those of a Cobb-Douglas function.






r = −ρ/(ρ − 1)
and
A =[ α/(1 − α)]
1/(1−ρ) ,
which is homogeneous in degree zero in (p,m).13 This generates the following












n is assumed to be distributed normally with mean zero and variance σ2
n.
Note that, as in AM, the demands are estimated as budget shares, which are
bounded between zero and one, with an i.i.d. error term. We generate estimates
of ˆ An and ˆ rn using non-linear tobit maximum likelihood, and use this to infer
the values of the underlying CES parameters ˆ αn and ˆ ρn and the elasticity of
substitution ˆ σn. We emphasize again that our estimations will be done for each
subject n separately, generating separate estimates ˆ An and ˆ rn.
Before proceeding to the estimations, we screen the data for subjects with
an E-index below 0.80,a st h ec h o i c e so fs u b j e c t sw i t hE-indices not suﬃciently
close to one cannot be utility-generated; we also screen out subjects with uni-
formly selﬁsh allocations (average πs/m0 ≥ 0.95). This left a total of 45 subjects
(59.2 percent) for whom we estimated parameters. Table 2 presents the results
of the estimations ˆ An, ˆ rn, ˆ an, ˆ ρn and ˆ σn sorted according to ascending values
of ˆ ρn.14
[Table 2 here]
13In the case of two goods, WARP and budget balancedness imply that demand functions
must be homogeneous of degree zero in (p,m).
14We generate virtually identical parameter values using non-linear least squares.
14Figure 9 shows a scatterplot of our estimates of the two relevant parameters
in the CES model, ˆ ρn and ˆ an (subjects ID 3, 46, 55 and 73 are excluded be-
cause they have very low ˆ ρ- v a l u e s ) .W ed i s t i n g u i s ht h eb e t w e e nt h ee s t i m a t e s
for subjects with an E-index above 0.80, 0.90 and 0.95.W e a l s o n o t e t h a t
there is considerable heterogeneity in both parameters, and that their values
are negatively correlated (r2 = −0.35).
[Figure 9 here]
Of the 45 subjects listed in Table 2, nine subjects (20.0 percent) have cleanly
classiﬁable preferences: two subjects (4.4 percent) have perfect substitutes pref-
erences (ˆ ρ ≈ 1), ﬁve subjects (11.1 percent) exhibit Cobb-Douglas preferences
(ˆ ρ ≈ 0), and two subjects (4.4 percent) exhibits Leontief preferences (very low
ˆ ρ-values). More interestingly, there is considerably heterogeneity in subjects’
preferences among those that cannot be cleanly categorized: 22 subjects (48.9
percent) have 0.1 ≤ ˆ ρ ≤ 0.9 so that the fraction kept, ˆ πs/m0,i n c r e a s e sw i t ht h e
price of giving p; these subjects thus show a preference for increasing total pay-
oﬀs. The 14 other subjects (31.1 percent) have negative values of ˆ ρ that are not
‘too low’ so that the fraction kept, ˆ πs/m0, decreases with the price of giving p;
these subjects thus show a preference for reducing diﬀerences in payoﬀs. Figure
10 presents the distribution of ˆ ρn rounded to a single decimal (subjects ID 3,
46, 55 and 73 are again excluded). We present the distribution for all subjects,
as well as the distributions for subjects with an E-index above 0.90 and 0.95.
[Figure 10 here]
The distributions shown in Figure 10 inform the debate about whether pref-
erences for giving are best thought of as preferences for increasing total payoﬀso r
for reducing diﬀerences in payoﬀs. Previous experimental studies have inferred
preferences from a small number of individual decisions and hence have been
forced to set up relatively extreme choice scenarios. Our method enables us to
confront subjects with a wide range of prices for giving, so that the speciﬁcation
of choice sets is less likely to inﬂuence subjects’ decisions. In particular, we do
not force subjects into choices that suggest discrete and extreme prototypical
preference types.
Figure 10 emphasizes the heterogeneity of preferences that we ﬁnd. Nev-
ertheless the distribution of types is skewed toward preferences for increasing
total payoﬀs rather than reducing diﬀerences in payoﬀs. Also, interestingly,
there is a signiﬁcant portion of subjects for whom ˆ ρ ≈ 0 (whose preferences are
Cobb-Douglas), and hence whose fraction kept ˆ πs/m0 is insensitive to the price
of giving. Thus, our results lean overall toward a social welfare conception of
preferences.
Figure 11 shows the relationship between log(p) and ˆ πs(p,m0)/m0 for the
three representative subjects that we followed in the non-parametric section and
also for some intermediate cases. Figure 11A shows the relationship for a subject
(ID 54) with ˆ ρ =0 .99 and ˆ α =0 .50, who is one of two subjects who very precisely
implemented utilitarian preferences. Figure 10B shows the subject (ID 46) who
15most closely approximated Leontief preferences with ˆ ρ = −5.37 and ˆ α =0 .66.
Figure 11C shows a subject (ID 40) with Cobb-Douglas preferences, again very
precisely implemented with ˆ ρ = −0.01 and ˆ α =0 .51. More interestingly, some
subjects made choices that may reﬂect preferences with intermediate parameter
values. Figures 11D (ˆ ρ =0 .43) and Figure 11E (ˆ ρ = −0.51) show such subjects
(ID 30 and 18 respectively).
[Figure 11 here]
Finally, the good ﬁt between observed behavior and classical utility theory
makes it appropriate to bring standard tools to bear on preferences for giving.
Figure 12 depicts the estimated indirect utility function ˆ vs(p,m)=us(ˆ πs(p,m))
by showing a three-dimensional mapping of log(p) and m onto ˆ vs for the ﬁve
subjects that we examine in Figure 11. More interestingly, Figure 13 shows the
eﬀect of p on ˆ vs holding m constant, and Figure 14 shows the typical (p,m)




6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
A new experimental design - employing graphical representations of modiﬁed
dictator games - enables us to collect richer data about preferences for giving
than has heretofore been possible. This enables us to analyze preferences for
giving at the individual level.
Our results are summarized as follows. First, a signiﬁcant majority of our
subjects exhibit behavior that appears to be almost optimizing in the sense
that their choices are close to satisfying both budget balancedness and GARP.
Second, the CES utility function provides a good ﬁt at the individual level.
Third, individual preferences are very heterogeneous, ranging from utilitarian to
Rawlsian to perfectly selﬁsh. A signiﬁcant majority of subjects have estimated
parameters that indicate a preference for increasing total payoﬀsr a t h e rt h a n
reducing diﬀerences in payoﬀs.
Many open questions remain about preferences for giving. For example, one
promising direction is to study decisions over non-linear budgets. Our setup
enables us to enrich the dictator experiment paradigm by testing any set, the-
oretically yielding richer data about choices than in the case of a simple linear
budget set. Implicit in the linear budget constraint are the assumptions of con-
stant and smooth substitution between payoﬀst oself and other and negligible
transfer costs. However, it is clear that even in the simple case of spending a
ﬁxed total on self and other, nonlinearities may arise. For example, an impor-
tant nonlinearity arises when the dictator has some initial endowment and faces
ad i ﬀerent price ratio in each direction.
16Ad i ﬀerent set of important nonlinearities arise when we move to questions
of preferences for giving over strictly convex budget sets. Such a setting would
be the obvious way to study the behavior of, for example, the circumstances
faced by head-of-family farmers in developing countries. Finally, nonlinearities
become even more pervasive when we move to non-convex sets, in which choices
that reduce diﬀerences in payoﬀs may make both players worse oﬀ.T h e e x -
perimental techniques that we have developed provide some promising tools for
future work in these areas.
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18Subject # GARP
ID # violations CI* violations E V EV E EV
4 0 1 0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
17 0 1 0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
31 0 1 0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
42 0 1 0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
57 0 1 0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
58 0 1 0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
60 0 1 0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
65 0 1 0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
40 0 1 4 0.998 0.920 0.978 0.994 0.971
22 0 1 2 0.998 0.980 0.980 0.994 0.973
20 0 1 2 0.996 0.960 0.974 0.991 0.966
32 0 1 4 0.991 0.940 0.982 0.979 0.976
41 0 1 5 0.990 0.940 0.984 0.976 0.978
50 2 2 9 0.990 0.840 0.916 0.975 0.887
33 0 1 3 0.990 0.980 0.973 0.975 0.964
9 0 1 2 0.989 0.960 0.960 0.973 0.946
27 0 1 2 0.989 0.960 0.969 0.972 0.958
35 0 1 3 0.985 0.980 0.948 0.962 0.931
24 0 1 5 0.985 0.920 0.967 0.962 0.956
15 1 3 9 0.983 0.900 0.965 0.958 0.953
67 0 1 3 0.983 0.940 0.960 0.957 0.947
25 0 1 3 0.981 0.940 0.963 0.953 0.951
68 3 3 9 0.980 0.920 0.948 0.949 0.930
18 1 2 7 0.978 0.880 0.937 0.946 0.915
23 0 1 3 0.978 0.980 0.931 0.944 0.908
8 0 1 1 0.977 0.980 0.971 0.943 0.961
38 0 1 14 0.977 0.940 0.947 0.942 0.929
(sorted according to descending E-values)
Table 1. Budget balancedness and GARP violations and the three indices by subject
Consistency measures** Violation indices budget balancednessTable 1 (cont.)
Subject # GARP
ID # violations CI* violations E V EV E EV
54 0 1 2 0.975 0.960 0.952 0.938 0.935
44 3 3 15 0.972 0.840 0.938 0.930 0.918
30 0 1 15 0.971 0.860 0.933 0.927 0.911
55 4 3 58 0.970 0.780 0.896 0.925 0.861
56 0 1 9 0.968 0.900 0.894 0.919 0.858
10 3 2 55 0.966 0.840 0.836 0.915 0.781
5 2 2 20 0.965 0.880 0.901 0.912 0.868
49 0 1 19 0.965 0.840 0.911 0.912 0.881
59 0 1 30 0.959 0.860 0.909 0.897 0.878
61 9 2 89 0.957 0.760 0.889 0.893 0.852
28 1 3 34 0.957 0.820 0.886 0.892 0.848
62 0 1 41 0.956 0.900 0.905 0.891 0.874
13 1 2 20 0.954 0.800 0.828 0.885 0.770
72 2 2 14 0.952 0.900 0.884 0.879 0.845
39 3 6 76 0.948 0.820 0.822 0.870 0.762
6 1 2 16 0.946 0.940 0.832 0.864 0.776
69 2 2 100 0.939 0.800 0.824 0.848 0.766
12 0 1 22 0.935 0.960 0.593 0.838 0.457
52 9 2 60 0.933 0.700 0.789 0.833 0.718
45 0 1 191 0.931 0.780 0.707 0.827 0.609
37 12 4 480 0.930 0.760 0.590 0.824 0.453
7 7 3 70 0.928 0.680 0.754 0.820 0.671
34 0 1 26 0.928 0.860 0.716 0.819 0.621
51 0 1 54 0.926 0.840 0.774 0.816 0.698
36 0 1 181 0.916 0.840 0.795 0.789 0.726
46 3 5 57 0.902 0.820 0.802 0.756 0.735
29 1 2 63 0.900 0.860 0.812 0.751 0.749
budget balancedness Violation indices Consistency measures**Table 1 (cont.)
Subject # GARP
ID # violations CI* violations E V EV E EV
73 3 5 221 0.899 0.680 0.676 0.748 0.567
70 0 1 24 0.892 0.840 0.877 0.731 0.835
66 2 2 541 0.865 0.800 0.518 0.663 0.356
64 6 5 132 0.848 0.720 0.693 0.619 0.590
21 0 1 539 0.845 0.820 0.486 0.612 0.313
1 0 1 376 0.844 0.780 0.464 0.610 0.284
11 1 2 209 0.834 0.840 0.658 0.586 0.543
3 4 6 332 0.817 0.700 0.390 0.544 0.185
43 0 1 248 0.811 0.740 0.510 0.529 0.346
14 5 2 19 0.806 0.840 0.741 0.514 0.654
47 17 12 359 0.798 0.600 0.533 0.494 0.377
75 26 6 446 0.792 0.760 0.540 0.479 0.386
63 1 2 73 0.716 0.940 0.507 0.290 0.342
19 15 9 497 0.710 0.660 0.256 0.276 0.006
74 21 15 521 0.697 0.800 0.402 0.242 0.202
53 2 4 942 0.619 0.840 0.196 0.048 -0.074
16 42 15 1005 0.606 0.840 0.205 0.016 -0.062
71 31 23 528 0.582 0.760 0.364 -0.046 0.151
2 8 12 1089 0.517 0.840 0.244 -0.207 -0.010
48 6 20 1037 0.500 0.860 0.069 -0.251 -0.243
26 10 32 797 0.272 0.840 0.185 -0.821 -0.088




index of one and the average random-choice index.
The difference between the actual index and the average random-choice index as a fraction of the difference between 
The confidence interval required to remove all budget balancedness violations.
budget balancedness Violation indices Consistency measures**ID ρ ασA r A r F-value
73 -14.813 1.000 -0.063 9.980 0.937 0.708 0.055 -87.794
46 -5.369 0.658 -0.157 1.108 0.843 0.031 0.040 -86.608
55 -2.786 0.993 -0.264 3.678 0.736 0.178 0.057 -79.227
3 -2.324 0.679 -0.301 1.253 0.699 0.089 0.085 -39.736
43 -0.672 0.961 -0.598 6.814 0.402 1.120 0.134 -39.690
36 -0.511 0.866 -0.662 3.430 0.338 0.270 0.067 -52.577
18 -0.507 0.554 -0.664 1.153 0.336 0.043 0.036 -69.368
37 -0.489 0.685 -0.672 1.686 0.328 0.099 0.071 -48.821
10 -0.476 0.971 -0.678 10.749 0.322 0.974 0.066 -86.621
1 -0.439 0.827 -0.695 2.970 0.305 0.332 0.150 -27.705
64 -0.435 0.962 -0.697 9.446 0.303 1.965 0.182 -23.831
45 -0.326 0.940 -0.754 7.924 0.246 1.046 0.133 -53.673
13 -0.132 0.922 -0.883 8.912 0.117 0.792 0.092 -75.707
61 -0.115 0.959 -0.897 16.978 0.103 1.654 0.126 -98.711
70 -0.111 0.864 -0.900 5.277 0.100 0.448 0.104 -58.064
21 -0.097 0.669 -0.912 1.897 0.088 0.167 0.100 -27.197
56 -0.083 0.517 -0.924 1.065 0.076 0.045 0.043 -60.128
6 -0.060 0.503 -0.943 1.012 0.057 0.020 0.020 -99.715
32 -0.040 0.516 -0.962 1.064 0.038 0.012 0.010 -128.900
40 -0.011 0.505 -0.989 1.020 0.011 0.014 0.012 -115.900
49 0.027 0.530 -1.028 1.133 -0.028 0.061 0.059 -53.317
52 0.114 0.767 -1.129 3.834 -0.129 0.281 0.059 -57.055
Standard errors
Table 2. Results of individual-level CES demand function estimationTable 2 (cont.)
ID ρ ασA r A r F-value
11 0.144 0.927 -1.168 19.575 -0.168 6.190 0.290 -36.330
72 0.170 0.670 -1.205 2.349 -0.205 0.155 0.073 -48.241
38 0.219 0.787 -1.280 5.323 -0.280 0.430 0.084 -61.866
69 0.231 0.638 -1.300 2.092 -0.300 0.197 0.108 -28.393
29 0.260 0.922 -1.351 28.095 -0.351 17.856 0.443 -20.957
34 0.291 0.532 -1.410 1.200 -0.410 0.099 0.077 -30.197
28 0.315 0.893 -1.460 22.187 -0.460 9.393 0.278 -16.375
66 0.329 0.581 -1.490 1.631 -0.490 0.181 0.123 -18.562
15 0.334 0.699 -1.501 3.549 -0.501 0.183 0.057 -72.855
50 0.337 0.579 -1.509 1.614 -0.509 0.084 0.064 -55.396
30 0.428 0.657 -1.747 3.123 -0.747 0.287 0.096 -46.677
9 0.493 0.748 -1.972 8.575 -0.972 0.905 0.110 -60.649
23 0.497 0.746 -1.987 8.508 -0.987 1.295 0.129 -32.981
7 0.543 0.706 -2.187 6.775 -1.187 1.193 0.167 -43.891
41 0.577 0.812 -2.362 31.464 -1.362 8.512 0.151 -75.664
39 0.583 0.649 -2.399 4.393 -1.399 0.709 0.152 -30.944
14 0.615 0.771 -2.598 23.339 -1.598 8.231 0.204 -38.780
5 0.658 0.576 -2.923 2.463 -1.923 0.293 0.230 -31.056
59 0.674 0.522 -3.065 1.317 -2.065 0.146 0.235 -31.640
51 0.702 0.580 -3.351 2.970 -2.351 0.766 0.373 1.957
12 0.823 0.639 -5.659 25.376 -4.659 25.809 1.452 26.995
8 0.942 0.532 -17.346 9.204 -16.346 5.941 3.734 -13.037
54 0.992 0.504 -117.970 6.345 -116.970 12.567 36.202 -96.376
Standard errorsFigure 1A. Decision-level distribution of expenditure on tokens given to others


































































Flat slopes Intermediate slopes Steep slopes AllFigure 2. The distribution of the expenditure on tokens given to others a fraction of total expenditure
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7A: Utilitarian ID 54  7B: Leontief  ID 46 
7C: Quasi concave ID 30 Figure 8. Illustration of forecasting behavior for subjects whose choices fit with prototypical utility functions 
 
 
7A: Utilitarian ID 54  7B: Leontief  ID 46 
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αFigure 10. The distribution of the CES parameter
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11D 11EFigure 12. The estimated indirect utility function for selected subjects 
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13D 13EFigure 14. A typical (p,m) indifference curves for selected subjects 
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